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Abstract 
This  paper  investigates  the  eﬀects  of  weather  risk  on  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  of 
agricultural  households  in  a  developing  country.  Faced  with  the  uninsurable  risk  of 
output  and  food  price  ﬂuctuations,  poor  farmers  in  developing  countries  may  diversify 
labor  allocation  across  activities  in  order  to  smooth  income  in  real  terms. A  key  feature 
of  this  paper  is  that  it  distinguishes  diﬀerent  types  of  oﬀ­farm  labor  markets:  agriculture 
and  non­agriculture  on  the  one  hand,  and,  wages  paid  in  cash  and  wages  paid  in  kind  on 
the  other.  We  develop  a  theoretical  model  of  household  optimization,  which  predicts  that 
when  farmers  are  faced  with  more  production  risk  in  their  farm  production,  they  ﬁnd  it 
more  attractive  to  engage  in  non­agricultural  work  as  a  means  of  risk  diversiﬁcation,  but 
the  agricultural  wage  sector  becomes  more  attractive  when  food  security  is  an  important 
issue  for  the  farmers  and  agricultural  wages  are  paid  in  kind.  To  test  this  prediction,  we 
estimate  a  multivariate  two­limit  tobit  model  of  labor  allocation  using  household  data 
from  rural  areas  of  Bihar  and  Uttar  Pradesh,  India.  The  regression  results  show  that  the 
share  of  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  increases  with  weather  risk,  the  increase  is  much  larger 
in  the  case  of  non­agricultural  work  than  in  the  case  of  agricultural  wage  work,  and  the 
increase  is  much  larger  in  the  case  of  agricultural  wages  paid  in  kind  than  in  the  cash 
wage  case.  Simulation  results  based  on  the  regression  estimates  show  that  the  sectoral 
diﬀerence  is  substantial,  implying  that  empirical  and  theoretical  studies  on  farmers’  labor 
supply  response  to  risk  should  distinguish  between  the  types  of  oﬀ­farm  work  involved. 
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1  Introduction 
This  paper  investigates  the  eﬀects  of  weather  risk  on  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  of  agricul­
tural  households  in  a  developing  country.  In  low­income  developing  countries  like  India, 
markets  for  agricultural  inputs  and  outputs  are  well­developed,  while  the  development  of 
credit  and  insurance  markets  has  been  lagging  behind  (Townsend,  1994;  Kochar,  1997a; 
1997b).  This  means  that  people  in  general,  and  particularly  poor  farmers,  have  few  means 
to  hedge  against  the  vagaries  of  production  and  price  shocks  that  may  put  their  livelihood 
at  risk  (Fafchamps,  2003;  Dercon,  2005).  It  has  long  been  argued  that  poor  farmers  in 
developing  countries  attempt  to  minimize  their  exposure  to  risk  by  growing  their  own  neces­
sities  (Fafchamps,  1992;  Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps,  2002),  diversifying  their  activities  (Walker 
and  Ryan,  1990;  Kurosaki,  1995),  and  through  other  income  smoothing  measures.  If  risk 
avoidance  inhibits  gains  from  specialization  and  prevents  farmers  from  achieving  the  output 
potential  they  would  be  capable  of,  the  provision  of  eﬃcient  insurance  mechanisms  becomes 
highly  important  in  poverty  reduction  policies. 
As  an  example  of  such  ineﬃciency  due  to  risk  avoidance,  we  focus  on  the  labor  supply  of 
farmers  in  developing  countries.  In  the  development  literature,  the  relationship  between  risk 
and  labor  market  participation  has  been  analyzed  by  several  authors.  For  example,  Kochar 
(1999)  and  Cameron  and  Worswick  (2003)  examined  the  role  of  labor  market  participation  as 
an  ex  post  risk­coping  mechanism  for  households  hit  by  idiosyncratic  shocks,  such  as  injury 
or  plot­level  crop  failure.  The  two  studies  showed  that  additional  wage  income  was  criti­
cally  important  for  shock­hit  households  in  India  (Kochar)  and  in  Indonesia  (Cameron  and 
Worswick)  to  maintain  consumption  levels.  Rose  (2001)  focused  on  the  role  of  labor  market 
participation  both  as  an  ex  ante  and  an  ex  post  response  to  covariate  shocks.  She  showed 
that  households  facing  a  greater  risk  in  terms  of  the  reliability  of  rainfall  were  more  likely  to 
participate  in  the  labor  market  (ex  ante  response).  Moreover,  unexpectedly  bad  weather  and 
low  rainfall  also  increased  labor  market  participation  (ex  post  response).  Finally,  Townsend 
(1994)  showed  that  Indian  villagers  found  it  more  diﬃcult  to  insure  against  covariate  risk 
than  against  idiosyncratic  risk. 
Taking  these  ﬁndings  as  our  point  of  departure,  we  argue  that  in  low­income  developing 
2 countries,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  diﬀerent  types  of  oﬀ­farm  labor  markets:  agriculture 
and  non­agriculture  on  the  one  hand,  and,  wages  paid  in  cash  and  wages  paid  in  kind  on 
the  other.  Rose’s  (2001)  analysis  simply  considered  a  single  labor  market  outside  the  farm, 
which,  however,  raises  the  following  problems.  First,  the  covariance  between  farming  returns 
and  agricultural  wages  is  likely  to  be  diﬀerent  from  the  covariance  between  farming  returns 
and  non­agricultural  wages.  When  an  area  is  hit  by  bad  weather,  this  may  lead  to  a  decline 
not  only  in  a  farmer’s  own  farm  income  but  also  reduce  the  demand  for  agricultural  labor 
outside  the  farm,  resulting  in  a  high  covariance  between  own­farm  returns  and  wages  available 
from  agricultural  work.  In  contrast,  wages  outside  agriculture  are  likely  to  be  less  correlated 
with  own­farm  returns  because  they  are  less  likely  to  be  aﬀected  by  the  same  kind  of  shocks. 
This  line  of  reasoning  suggests  that  agricultural  households  would  ﬁnd  it  more  attractive 
to  engage  in  non­agricultural  work  as  a  means  of  ex  ante  risk  diversiﬁcation.  Second,  the 
covariance  between  wages  and  food  prices  also  matters  in  determining  the  level  of  real  income 
(Fafchamps,  1992;  Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps,  2002;  Kurosaki,  2006). For  farmers  for  whom 
food  security  is  an  issue,  agricultural  work  may  nevertheless  be  more  attractive  than  non­
agricultural work  if  agricultural wages  are  paid  in  kind,  since  the  monetary  value  of  wages 
paid  in  paddy  (the  staple  crop)  is  positively  correlated  with  the  paddy  price.  This  paper 
shows  that  both  of  these  considerations  do  indeed  play  a  role  in  determining  the  oﬀ­farm 
labor  supply  of  farmers  in  a  developing  country. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  present  a  theoretical 
model  to  explain  how  farmers  decide  to  allocate  their  labor,  incorporating  considerations  of 
food  security.  We  test  the  predictions  of  the  model  using  household  data  from  two  Indian 
states,  Bihar  and  Uttar  Pradesh.  The  dataset  is  described  in  Section  3,  while  the  regression 
results  of  a  multivariate  two­limit  tobit  model  of  labor  allocation  are  presented  in  Section 
4.  The  results  robustly  show  that  the  share  of  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  increases  with 
weather  risk,  the  increase  is  much  larger  in  the  case  of  non­agricultural  work  than  in  the 
case  of  agricultural  wage  work,  and  the  increase  is  much  larger  in  the  case  of  agricultural 
wages  paid  in  kind  than  in  the  cash  wage  case.  Section  5  shows  simulation  results  based  on 
the  regression  estimates  in  order  to  examine  whether  the  sectoral  diﬀerence  is  economically 
signiﬁcant.  Section  6  concludes  the  paper. 
3 2  A  Theoretical  Model  of  Labor  Allocation 
In  this  section,  we  present  a  theoretical  model  to  guide  our  empirical  analysis.  Throughout 
the  section,  we  assume  a  unitary  decision  making  process  at  the  household  level  with  respect 
to  labor  allocation  (Singh  et  al.,  1986).1  To  stylize  the  conditions  of  low­income  developing 
countries,  we  assume  that  there  are  only  two  consumption  items:  “food,”  which  is  the  main 
output  in  production  and  the  main  item  in  consumption;  and  “non­food,”  whose  price  is 
normalized  at  one.  The  food  price  is  p  (=  θpp ¯),  where  θp  is  the  multiplicative  price  risk  with 
a  mean  of  one. 
¯ For  simplicity,  we  ﬁx  the  total  labor  supply  at  L,  ignoring  the  labor­leisure  choice.  The 
welfare  of  the  household  is  measured  by  its  expected  utility,  which  is  deﬁned  as  E[v(y,p)] 
with  the  following  properties: 
vy  >  0, vp  <  0, vyy  <  0, vpp  <  0, vyp  >  0, vyyy  >  0.  (1) 
The  ﬁrst  two  properties  are  required  for  a  valid  indirect  utility  function.  The  third  property 
guarantees  that  the  household  is  risk­averse  in  the  Arrow­Pratt  sense,  and  the  fourth  implies 
that,  for  a  given  income  level,  the  household’s  welfare  decreases  when  the  food  price  variabil­
ity  increases.  The  fourth  property  is  especially  appropriate  for  a  (potentially)  food­insecure 
household  in  a  developing  country  (Kurosaki,  2006).  The  last  assumption,  vyyy  >  0,  corre­
sponds  to  “risk  prudence,”  which  is  required  for  the  welfare  cost  of  consumption  ﬂuctuations 
to  decrease  with  the  level  of  expected  consumption  (Kimball,  1990).  In  eﬀect,  these  assump­
tions  guarantee  that  the  household  behaves  in  a  risk­averse  and  prudent  way  with  respect 
to  income  variability,  suﬀers  if  food  price  variability  is  higher,  and  gains  if  the  correlation 
between  the  food  price  and  income  is  higher.2 
¯ There  are  four  diﬀerent  types  of  activity  to  which  the  household  can  allocate  labor  L 
(indicated  by  subscript  j):  own  farming  (j  =  a),  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash  (j  =  b), 
agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind  (j  =  c),  and  non­agricultural  wage  work  (j  =  d).  We 
1This  assumption  is  based  on  our  preliminary  result  from  various  demographic  and  health  surveys  in  the 
world  that  bargaining  issues  are  less  important  in  South  Asia  than  in  Sub­Saharan  Africa.  Extending  the 
analysis  of  this  paper  under  a  non­unitary  household  modeling  framework  and  empirically  testing  whether 
bargaining  among  members  within  a  household  is  important  in  the  current  dataset  are  left  for  further  study. 




assume  that  non­agricultural  wages  are  always  paid  in  cash.  Since  the  total  labor  supply  is 
ﬁxed,  the  decision  variables  are  the  shares  of  each  type  of  labor  (�j).  From  each  activity,  the 
¯ household  obtains  a  labor  return  of  θjfj(�jL),  where  θj  is  the  multiplicative  risk  at  the  local 
level  with  a  mean  of  one,  and  f(.) is  a  function  characterizing  the  expected  value  of  the  labor 
return. Function  f(.)  is  likely  to  be  linear  for  wage  work  outside  the  farm  while  it  is  likely 
to  be  concave  for  own  farming.  Thus,  the  household’s  optimization  problem  is  expressed  as: 
max  E[v(y,p, Xp)],  (2)
�j 
subject  to  the  budget  constraint 
¯  y  =  y0  +  θjfj(�jL,Xw),  (3) 
j 
the  time  constraint 
�j  = 1,  (4) 
j 
and  the  non­negativity  conditions  for  �j,  j  =  a, b,c, d.  Xp  and  Xw  are  vectors  of  household 
characteristics:  Xp  includes  shifters  of  preferences  with  respect  to  risk  exposure  and  food 
subsistence  needs,  while  Xw  includes  shifters  of  household  members’  productivity,  such  as 
land,  ﬁxed  capital,  and  human  capital.  y0  denotes  unearned  income. 
The  ﬁrst  order  conditions  for  the  interior  solution  to  this  optimization  problem  are  as 
follows: 
∂fk E[vyθj]
∂fj  =  E[vyθk] , j  = � k,  (5)
∂L  ∂L 
¯ where  ∂fj/∂L  =  ∂fj/∂(�jL),  which  is  the  expected  value  of  the  marginal  labor  return  on 
activity  j.  When  there  is  no  risk,  or  there  is  risk  but  vy  and  θj  are  independent  for  all  j, 
equation  (5)  reduces  to  the  familiar  condition  that  marginal  returns  are  equilibrated  across 
activities.  This  is  unlikely,  however,  when  there  is  risk  —  we  expect  vy  and  θj  to  be  negatively 
correlated  through  the  budget  constraint  (3)  and  due  to  the  assumption  of  vyy  <  0. 
Applying  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  (5),  we  obtain  the  reduced­form  optimal 
solution  as 
�∗ =  �j(¯ 
j  L,Xp,Xw,Σ), j =  a, b,c, d,  (6) 
5 where  Σ  is  the  covariance  matrix  of  θa,  θb,  θc,  θd,  and  θp.  To  stylize  typical  situations  in 
rural  India,  the  theoretical  discussion  assumes  the  following:  (i)  non­agricultural  wages  are 
not  correlated  with  farm  income,  agricultural  wages,  and  the  food  price;  (ii)  farm  income 
and  agricultural  wages  are  positively  correlated,  and  the  correlation  is  greater  when  wages 
are  paid  in  kind  (i.e.  food)  than  when  wages  are  paid  in  cash;  and  (iii)  agricultural  wages 
and  the  food  price  are  positively  correlated,  and  the  correlation  is  greater  when  wages  are 
paid  in  kind  than  when  wages  are  paid  in  cash.  Under  these  assumptions,  it  is  likely  that 
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∂�b  ,  (7) >
 > , 
where  σa  is  the  coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  θa  (see  Appendix  I  for  the  derivation). 
The  ﬁrst  relation  in  (7)  implies  that  the  own­farm  labor  supply  declines  as  production 
becomes  riskier.  In  other  words,  farmers  ﬁnd  it  more  attractive  to  engage  in  oﬀ­farm  work  as 
a  means  of  ex  ante  diversiﬁcation  under  riskier  farming  conditions.  However,  the  alternatives 
to  own­farm  work  are  not  homogeneous.  The  second  and  third  relations  in  (7)  imply  that  it 
is  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind  and  non­agricultural  wage  work  that  absorb  a  larger 
share  of  the  displaced  labor.  This  is  what  we  empirically  test  in  Section  4. 
The  reason  why  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind  is  more  attractive  to  farmers 
than  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash  is  as  follows.  When  the  food  price  ﬂuctuates,  what 
matters  to  farmers  is  not  the  level  or  stability  of  nominal  income  but  the  level  and  stability  of 
real  income.  Since  the  food  price  and  shocks  to  labor  returns  are  not  independent,  the  labor 
allocation  may  aﬀect  the  level  and  stability  of  food­insecure  farmers’  real  income  through  the 
covariance  between  the  food  price  and  shocks  to  labor  returns  (Fafchamps,  1992).  Since  wage 
levels  are  usually  rigid,  the  correlation  is  expected  to  be  close  to  zero  when  the  agricultural 
wage  is  paid  in  cash,  while  it  is  expected  to  be  positive  when  the  wage  is  paid  in  kind 
(Kurosaki,  2006).  As  the  second  relation  in  (7)  shows,  agricultural  work  paid  in  kind  is  more 
attractive  than  agricultural  work  paid  in  cash  because  of  the  diﬀerence  in  the  correlation. 
Thus,  as  an  empirically  veriﬁable  prediction,  we  test  whether  the  eﬀect  of  σa  on  the  labor 
supply  share  to  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind  is  larger  than  that  on  the  labor  share  to 
agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash. 
6 3  Data 
3.1  Household  Data  on  Labor  Allocation 
In  the  empirical  part  of  this  paper,  we  use  data  obtained  from  the  Survey  of  Living  Con­
ditions,  Uttar  Pradesh  and  Bihar,  which  is  one  of  the  Living  Standard  Measurement  Study 
(LSMS)  surveys  conducted  in  developing  countries  with  technical  guidance  from  the  World 
Bank.  Uttar  Pradesh  (UP)  and  Bihar  are  located  in  the  Ganges  Plain  of  North  India  and 
are  known  for  their  high  incidence  of  poverty.  The  survey  was  conducted  in  1997/98  and 
covers  1,035  households  from  57  villages  in  13  districts  of  Bihar  and  1,215  households  from 
63  villages  in  12  districts  of  UP.  To  focus  on  the  labor  allocation  of  agricultural  households, 
households  operating  no  farmland  and  households  with  missing  information  on  labor  were 
excluded  from  our  analysis  (the  number  of  excluded  households  is  580).  The  sample  used 
in  this  paper  thus  comprises  owner  farm  households,  owner­cum­tenant  farm  households, 
and  pure  tenant  households.  Information  on  working  days  per  month  and  average  working 
hours  per  day  is  available  for  each  household  member  from  January  1997  to  December  1997. 
From  this  information,  we  compile  the  household­level  data  on  the  amount  of  labor  allo­
cated  to  each  of  the  following  ﬁve  activities:  (a)  self­employment  in  agriculture,  (b)  wage 
work  in  agriculture  paid  in  cash,  (c)  wage  work  in  agriculture  paid  in  kind,  (d)  wage  work 
in  non­agriculture,  and  (e)  self­employment  in  non­agriculture. 
Based  on  these  ﬁve  activities,  we  divide  patterns  of  labor  allocation  into  ﬁve  categories 
(Table  1).  Among  the  ﬁve  categories,  category  A,  households  relying  on  self­employed  work 
only,  make  up  the  largest  group,  accounting  for  41.4%  of  the  total,  followed  by  households 
that  combine  own  farming  with  wage  work  (pattern  C,  36.4%).  Yet,  oﬀ­farm  labor  is  clearly 
important  for  agricultural  households:  58.6%  of  households  had  one  or  more  family  members 
that  were  engaged  in  wage  work  in  agriculture  or  non­agriculture  (‘Including  (b),  (c),  or  (d)’ 
in  the  table).  The  table  also  shows  that  work  in  non­agriculture  was  more  frequent  than 
work  in  agriculture  (48.3%  versus  28.4%  of  households). 
Table  2  shows  the  household  characteristics  arranged  by  the  three  typical  patterns  of  la­
bor  allocation.  Comparing  the  second  row  titled  ‘Self­employment  only’  with  the  other  rows, 
we  see  that  farm  households  with  income  sources  other  than  own  farming  have  less  farmland. 
7
For  households  with  only  small  landholdings  relative  to  the  number  of  household  members, 
it  is  diﬃcult  to  make  a  living  based  on  farming  alone.  Such  households  consequently  allo­
cate  more  labor  to  oﬀ­farm  work.  Similar  ﬁndings  have  been  reported  for  India  as  a  whole 
based  on  nation­wide  surveys  in  1999/2000  (NSSO,  2000)  and  1993/94  data  collected  by  the 
National  Centre  of  Applied  Economic  Research  (Lanjouw  and  Shariﬀ,  2004). 
The  column  titled  ‘Annual  labor  supply’  in  Table  2 also  shows  that  pure  farm  households 
(‘Self­employment  only’)  supply  the  smallest  amount  of  labor  per  household.  By  dividing 
‘Annual  labor  supply’  by  ‘No.  of  working  members,’  we  can  obtain  the  total  labor  supply 
per  person.  Pure  farm  households  still  supply  the  smallest  amount  of  labor  per  person. 
According  to  the  standard  agricultural  household  model  (Singh  et  al.,  1986),  the  smaller 
labor  supply  of  these  farm  households  indicates  that  their  reservation  wage  is  higher  than 
that  of  other  households  because  these  farm  households  have  larger  landholdings. 
3.2  District  Data  on  Rainfall  and  the  Estimation  of  Covariate  Risk 
In  order  to  empirically  test  the  theoretical  predictions,  we  need  a  proxy  for  σa  (the  coeﬃcient 
of  variation  of  local  production  shocks  in  farming).  As  the  proxy  variable,  we  compile  the 
coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  annual  rainfall  at  the  district  level.  The  data  source  is  Johnson 
et  al.  (2003).  To  conﬁrm  that  the  variation  of  rainfall  is  a  relevant  proxy,  we  regress  rice 
production  on  rainfall  and  other  explanatory  variables.  The  source  for  our  data  on  rice 
production  is  GOI  (2001). 
Table  3,  column  1  reports  the  results  of  this  regression.  To  control  for  diﬀerences  in 
topology,  land  fertility,  and  other  agro­ecological  factors,  district  ﬁxed  eﬀects  are  included. 
The  eﬀect  of  rainfall  on  rice  production  is  positive  and  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  the  1% 
level:  an  increase  in  rainfall  by  one  standard  deviation  raises  rice  production  by  11,300  tons. 
Our  rainfall  variable  is  thus  a  good  proxy  for  the  rice  production  risk.  In  addition,  rice 
production  and  the  agricultural  value­added  at  the  state  level  are  highly  correlated,  with  a 
time­series  correlation  coeﬃcient  of  0.85  for  Bihar  and  0.97  for  UP.  Therefore,  our  rainfall 
variable  is  a  valid  proxy  for  the  agricultural  production  risk  at  the  district  level. 
In  order  to  verify  the  validity  of  the  assumptions  (i)  and  (ii)  in  the  theoretical  model 
(non­agricultural  wages  are  not  correlated  with  farm  income,  while  agricultural  wages  are 
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positively  correlated),  we  also  regress  daily  wage  rates  of  plowmen  and  carpenters  on  rainfall 
(Table  3,  columns  2  and  3).  The  data  source  on  wage  rates  is  GOI  (1991­2000).  After 
controlling  for  district  heterogeneity  by  district  ﬁxed  eﬀects  and  controlling  for  ﬂuctuation  in 
prices  by  year  dummies,  the  eﬀect  of  rainfall  on  market  wages  is  positive  in  both  models,  but 
only  the  eﬀect  on  agricultural  wages  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  10%  level.  The  magnitude 
of  the  coeﬃcient  is  considerably  (approximately  six  times)  larger  than  the  magnitude  of  the 
coeﬃcient  in  the  non­agricultural  wage  regression.  Therefore,  our  assumptions  are  validated 
by  the  data. 
3.3  Description  of  Variables 
Summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  regression  analysis  are  presented  in  Table  4. 
The  dependent  variables  are  the  shares  of  the  diﬀerent  types  of  work:  own  farming  (j  =  a), 
agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash  (j  =  b),  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind  (j  =  c), 
non­agricultural  wage  work  (j  =  d),  and  own  business  in  non­agriculture  (j  =  e).  Since 
the  ﬁve  shares  add  up  to  100%  by  deﬁnition,  we  drop  the  last  category,  self­employment  in 
non­agriculture,  in  the  regression  analysis  below. 
Adopting  a  reduced­form  approach,  we  regress  the  four  dependent  variables  on  house­
hold  characteristics  (X) and  a  covariate  risk  factor  (σa).  In  the  theoretical  discussion  above, 
we  distinguished  between  two  types  of  household  characteristics:  those  aﬀecting  households’ 
preferences  (Xp)  and  those  aﬀecting  household  members’  productivity  (Xw).  However,  in 
the  reduced­form  approach,  it  is  diﬃcult  to  clearly  assign  each  X  either  to  Xp  or  to  Xw.  For 
instance,  the  size  of  a  household’s  landholdings,  credit  status,  the  number  of  working  house­
hold  members,  and  their  educational  attainment  may  aﬀect  both  the  household’s  preferences 
and  household  members’  productivity.  Therefore,  we  do  not  attempt  to  clearly  assign  each 
of  these  variables  either  to  Xp  or  to  Xw  but  treat  these  variables  as  those  controlling  for  Xp 
and  Xw  jointly.  In  addition  to  the  landholding  size,  we  include  a  dummy  for  land  ownership. 
Since  the  landholding  size  variable  captures  the  marginal  eﬀect  of  having  an  additional  acre 
of  land,  the  landholding  dummy  captures  the  threshold  eﬀect  for  a  landless  household  to 
become  a  landowner. We  can  safely  attribute  part  of  this  threshold  eﬀect  to  risk  tolerance. 
Controlling  for  X,  we  test  the  prediction  from  Section  2 with  respect  to  σa.  As  covariate 
9 risk  factors,  ideally,  we  should  include  not  only  σa,  but  also  the  full  covariance  matrix  of 
shocks  to  oﬀ­farm  wages  and  food  prices.  Due  to  data  constraints,  this  is  left  for  future 
research.  As  a  proxy  for  the  coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  production  shocks,  the  district­level 
coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  annual  rainfall  (CV  of  rainfal l) is  employed.  In  addition,  as  another 
covariate  risk  factor,  Rainfal l  shock  is  included  to  capture  the  ex  post  response  of  oﬀ­farm 
labor  supply  to  production  shocks.  We  would  expect  a  negative  coeﬃcient  on  this  variable  if 
households  increase  their  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  primarily  as  a  result  of  a  failure  in  rainfall.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  households  increase  their  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  in  anticipation  of  rainfall 
shocks,  then  we  would  expect  a  positive  coeﬃcient  on  the  CV  of  rainfal l  variable. 
As  further  control  variables,  we  also  include  several  village­level  and  district­level  char­
acteristics.  Of  these  variables,  a  village­level  irrigation  indicator  (Irrigation  indicator)  is 
intended  to  capture  the  impact  of  irrigation  in  reducing  the  village­level  production  risk. 
Because  the  extent  to  which  the  weather  risk  aﬀects  farm  production  diﬀers  according  to  the 
availability  of  irrigation  facilities,  we  control  for  the  eﬀects  of  irrigation  at  the  village  and 
household  levels.  After  controlling  for  these  eﬀects,  we  can  expect  CV  of  rainfal l  to  capture 
the  precise  impact  of  the  covariate  risk  in  agricultural  production  on  labor  supply. 
4  Estimation  Results 
Using  the  dataset  described  above,  we  estimate  the  reduced­form  determinants  of  oﬀ­farm 
labor  supply.  Since  there  are  four  dependent  variables,  all  of  which  are  censored  at  0  and 
100,  we  employ  a  multivariate  two­limit  tobit  model.3  Estimation  results  are  reported  in 
Table  5. 
Among  household  characteristics,  Land  owned,  Irrigation  ratio,  Agric.  capital,  and 
Livestock  mostly  have  a  positive  eﬀect  on  the  on­farm  labor  supply  (�a) and  a  negative  eﬀect 
on  the  oﬀ­farm  supply  (�b,  �c,  and  �d).  Since  all  of  these  variables  raise  the  productivity  of 
own  farming,  they  mainly  correspond  to  Xw  (productivity  shifters)  in  the  theoretical  model. 
In  addition,  in  the  context  of  rural  India,  these  variables  are  also  indicators  of  wealth,  which 
may reduce  households’  risk  aversion  (Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps,  2002).  Thus,  to  some  extent, 
3We  wrote  a  STATA  program  for  the  maximum  likelihood  estimator  using  the  Geweke­Ha jvassiliou­Keane 
(GHK)  simulator  to  estimate  the  tobit  model.  The  program  is  available  on  request. 
10 these  variables  also  correspond  to  Xp  (preferences  shifters)  in  the  theoretical  model. 
Looking  at  education,  we  ﬁnd  that  it  signiﬁcantly  decreases  the  share  of  agricultural 
wage  work.  This  reﬂects  the  lack  of  response  of  agricultural  wages  to  human  capital  in  South 
Asia  (Kurosaki  and  Khan,  2006)  and  the  stigma  associated  in  rural  India  with  working  as  an 
agricultural  laborer.  Once  villagers  are  educated,  they  tend  to  be  very  reluctant  to  perform 
manual  agricultural  work  for  others.  Turning  to  the  demographic  variables,  we  ﬁnd  that 
the  larger  the  number  of  working­age  males  and  of  dependents  in  a  household,  the  lower 
is  the  labor  share  allocated  to  own  farming  and  the  higher  share  devoted  to  oﬀ­farm  wage 
work.  On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  working­age  females  in  a  household  does  not  have 
a  signiﬁcant  eﬀect  in  all  four  equations.  This  result  reﬂects  the  fact  that  adult  women  in 
rural  India  typically  perform  domestic  chores.  Looking  at  the  role  of  castes,  we  ﬁnd  that 
households  belonging  to  backward  or  scheduled  castes  are  more  likely  to  send  members 
to  perform  agricultural  wage  work.  This  result  is  consistent  with  Ito’s  (2007)  ﬁnding  of 
occupational  segmentation  or  job  discrimination  against  the  backward  castes  using  the  same 
dataset. 
Turning  to  the  variable  of  interest  in  this  paper,  CV  of  rainfal l,  we  ﬁnd  that  this  has 
a  signiﬁcant  negative  impact  on  the  on­farm  labor  supply  (�a).  Thus,  the  ﬁrst  theoretical 
prediction  of  (7)  that  the  optimal  on­farm  labor  supply  is  a  decreasing  function  of  farming 
risk  is  conﬁrmed.  This  result  implies  that  farm  households  facing  riskier  distributions  of 
rainfall  increase  their  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply.  However,  as  shown  in  the  table,  the  impact  of 
weather  risk  varies  widely  across  diﬀerent  types  of  oﬀ­farm  work:  while  CV  of  rainfal l  has 
a  signiﬁcant  positive  impact  on  �c  (agricultural  work  paid  in  kind)  and  �d  (non­agricultural 
wage  work),  the  impact  of  weather  risk  on  �b  (agricultural  work  paid  in  cash)  is  negative  and 
statistically  insigniﬁcant.  In  addition,  the  magnitude  of  the  increase  is  much larger  for  �d  than 
for  �c.  Thus,  the  second  and  third  theoretical  predictions  of  (7)  that  non­agricultural  wage 
work  absorbs  a  larger  share  of  the  displaced  labor  and  the  attractiveness  of  agricultural  work 
increases  when  wages  are  paid  in  kind  are  conﬁrmed.  As  predicted  theoretically,  agricultural 
households  facing  a  greater  weather  risk  tend  to  divert  more  labor  to  oﬀ­farm  work,  mainly 
in  non­agriculture. 
In  contrast,  while  CV  of  rainfal l  has  expected  signs  in  all  four  equations  and  mostly 
11 statistically  signiﬁcant,  Rainfal l  shock  does  not:  in  the  regressions  for  �a  and  �d,  the  coeﬃcient 
on  Rainfal l  shock  shows  the  opposite  sign,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  although  it  is  not 
statistically  signiﬁcant.  The  coeﬃcient  on  Rainfal l  shock  in  the  regression  for  �b  is  positive 
and  signiﬁcant,  implying  that  farmers  supply  more  labor  to  this  type  of  work  when  they 
receive  more  rain  than  usual.  Our  results  are  thus  slightly  diﬀerent  from  Rose’s  result  (2001) 
that  bad  weather  shocks  signiﬁcantly  increase  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply.  Therefore,  we 
conclude  that  oﬀ­farm  labor  in  the  study  region  serves  more  as  an  ex  ante  income  diversifying 
measure  than  as  an  ex  post  measure. 
To  examine  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  try  out  various  alternative  speciﬁcations. 
Appendix  II  reports  the  detail.  These  additional  results  conﬁrm  that  the  share  of  the  oﬀ­
farm  labor  supply  increases  with  weather  risk,  the  increase  is  much  larger  in  the  case  of 
non­agricultural work  than  in  the  case  of  agricultural wage  work,  and  the  increase  is  much 
larger  in  the  case  of  agricultural  wages  paid  in  kind  than  in  the  cash  wage  case. 
5  A  Simulation  of  the  Impact  of  Weather  Risk 
In  this  section,  simulation  exercises  are  conducted  based  on  the  estimation  results  reported 
in  Table  5  in  order  to  examine  the  economic  signiﬁcance  of  the  eﬀect  of  weather  risk  on  oﬀ­
farm  labor  supply.  First,  to  compare  our  results  with  those  of  Rose  (2001),  the  probability  of 
wage  labor  market  participation  is  simulated.  Since  the  probability  is  not  readily  available 
from  the  multivariate  tobit  model  adopted  in  this  paper,  we  employ  the  procedure  proposed 
by  Cornick  et  al.  (1994)  and  run  Monte­Carlo  simulations  (see  Appendix  III  for  details). 
Table  6  reports  our  simulation  results.  Despite  the  diﬀerence  in  methodology  and  data, 
our  simulation  results  with  respect  to  oﬀ­farm  work  (agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash, 
agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind,  and  non­agricultural  wage  work  pooled;  last  column) 
are  qualitatively  similar  to  those  obtained  by  Rose  (2001).4  Our  results  indicate  that,  when 
the  weather  risk  increases  (CV  of  rainfal l  increases  from  its  minimum  to  its  maximum),  the 
percentage  of  households  participating  in  oﬀ­farm  wage  work  increases  from  49%  to  77%. 
4Rose  (2001)  estimated  a  random  eﬀects  probit  model  using  a  dummy  variable  for  wage  work  participation 
as  the  dependent  variable.  Thus,  her  estimation  results  readily  provide  the  ﬁgures  for  Table  6  without  the 
need  for  Monte­Carlo  simulations.  In  addition,  she  used  three­year  panel  data  of  2,115  households  spanning 
13  states  of  India  in  1968/69  ­ 1970/71. 
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Both  ﬁgures  are  larger  than  those  obtained  by  Rose  (2001),  but  the  direction  of  change 
is  the  same.  However,  our  research  approach  allows  us  to  go  further  and  decompose  this 
response  into  three  types  of  wage  work.  Doing  so  indicates  that  agricultural  work  paid  in 
cash  decreases  by  6  percentage  points,  while  agricultural  work  paid  in  kind  increases  by  13 
percentage  points  and  non­agricultural work  increases  by  as  much  as  38  percentage  points. 
The  impact  of  weather  risk  on  oﬀ­farm  labor  participation  is  thus  very  diﬀerent  across  sectors. 
In  the  lower  half  of  Table  6,  we  report  simulation  results  of  the  expected  changes  in 
labor  supply  shares.  The  ﬁrst  two  rows  provide  the  response  of  �j.  These  ﬁgures  show  that 
the  labor  share  allocated  to  oﬀ­farm  work  increases  with  the  increase  in  CV  of  rainfal l  and 
the  response  of  non­agricultural  wage  work  is  more  substantial. 
These  results  thus  conﬁrm  that  oﬀ­farm  work  in  the  non­agricultural  sector  plays  an 
important  role  in  diversifying  farm  production  risk.  It  is  implied,  therefore,  that  empirical 
and  theoretical  studies  on  farmers’  labor  supply  response  to  risk  should  distinguish  between 
diﬀerent  types  of  oﬀ­farm work  involved.  This  implication  is  also  conﬁrmed  by  the  results 
of  further  speciﬁcation  tests  reported  in  Table  7.  We  test  the  following  null  hypotheses:  (1) 
all  coeﬃcients  in  the  regressions  for  agricultural  wage  work  (�b  and  �c)  are  equal  and  (2) 
all  coeﬃcients  in  the  regressions  for  all  three  wage  work  (�b,  �c,  and  �d)  are  equal.  The  LR 
χ2  statistics  show  that  both  hypotheses  are  rejected  at  the  1  %  level,  indicating  that  the 
sectoral  diﬀerence  is  substantial. 
Conclusion 
This  paper  investigated  the  eﬀects  of  weather  risk  on  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  of  agricultural 
households  in  a  developing  country,  distinguishing  diﬀerent  types  of  oﬀ­farm  labor  markets: 
agriculture  and  non­agriculture  on  the  one  hand,  and,  wages  paid  in  cash  and  wages  paid 
in  kind  on  the  other.  We  developed  a  theoretical  model  of  household  optimization,  which 
predicts  that  when  farmers  are  faced  with  more  production  risk  in  their  farm  production,  they 
ﬁnd  it  more  attractive  to  engage  in  non­agricultural  work  as  a  means  of  risk  diversiﬁcation, 
but  the  agricultural  wage  sector  becomes  more  attractive  when  food  security  is  an  important 
issue  for  the  farmers  and  agricultural  wages  are  paid  in  kind.  This  prediction  was  conﬁrmed 
by  regression  analyses  using  household  data  from  rural  areas  of  Bihar  and  Uttar  Pradesh, 
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India.  Simulation  results  based  on  the  regression  estimates  showed  that  the  sectoral  diﬀerence 
is  substantial. 
These  results  imply  that  risk  avoidance  inhibits  gains  from  specialization  and  prevents 
farmers  from  achieving  their  output  potential.  Therefore,  a  crucial  measure  to  reduce  poverty 
in  the  study  region  would  be  to  provide  more  eﬃcient  insurance  or  risk­reducing  mechanisms. 
Such  measures  could  take  various  forms:  reducing  variability  in  agricultural  production  and 
in  food  price  by  promoting  risk­reducing  technologies  such  as  irrigation  and/or  food  market 
integration,  reducing  the  transmission  of  production  shocks  to  income  shocks  through  crop 
insurance  schemes,  improving  credit  opportunities  to  smooth  consumption  in  the  face  of 
income  shocks,  etc.  This  study  shows  that  labor  markets  potentially  also  play  a  role  in 
reducing  households’  vulnerability to  risk.  If  labor  markets  are  used  as  an  income  diversifying 
measure,  it  is  critically  important  to  promote  sectors  whose  wages  are  less  correlated  with 
farm  production  shocks.  This  is  the  main  lesson  of  this  paper. 
Considering  the  considerable  diversity  of  non­agricultural  wage  work,  a  possible  exten­
sion  of  our  research  on  oﬀ­farm  labor  as  a  means  of  diversifying  risk  would  be  to  disaggregate 
non­agricultural  wage  labor  opportunities.  Since  the  regression  model  in  this  paper  included 
only  the  variance  term  of  the  shock  to  own  farming,  incorporating  a  full  set  of  correlation 
coeﬃcients  among  the  shocks  to  diﬀerent  sectors  would  be  an  interesting  exercise.  Since 
we  did  not  attempt  to  clearly  assign  each  of  the  household  characteristics  to  either  prefer­
ence  or  productivity  shifters,  distinguishing  the  two  more  clearly  would  be  another  area  for 
extension.  These  issues  are  left  for  further  research  using  a  dataset  with  additional  variables. 
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Appendix  I:  Comparative  Statics 
This  appendix  provides  a  comparative­static  analysis  of  �j(¯  L, Xp,Xw,Σ),  j  =  a, b, c, d  (the 
optimal  labor  supply).  In  the  comparative­static  analysis,  the  term  vy  in  the  ﬁrst  order  con­
dition  (5)  is  the  key.  Applying  a  Taylor  approximation  to  vy  and  then  totally  diﬀerentiating 
Roy’s  identity,  we  obtain: 
vy  ≈ v ¯y  1 − ψ
y p y  − ¯
+  s(ψ  − η)
p − ¯




where  ψ  (≡ −yvyy/vy) is  the  Arrow­Pratt  measure  of  relative  risk  aversion,  s  (≡ pq/y,  where 
q  is  the  Marshallian  demand  for  food)  is  the  budget  share  of  food,  and  η  (≡ ∂ ln q/∂  ln y)  is 
the  income  elasticity  of  food  demand.  ψ,  s,  and  η  are  all  evaluated  at  the  means  of  y  and  p 
so  that  they  are  treated  as  constant  in  the  following  exposition.  Note  that  the  assumption 
of  vyp  >  0  is  equivalent  to  the  assumption  of  ψ >  η  in  this  approximation,  which  is  likely  to 
be  satisﬁed  for  low­income  households  (Fafchamps,  1992). 
The  assumptions  in  Section  2  imply  the  following  structure  of  Σ  (the  covariance  matrix 
of  θa,  θb,  θc,  θd,  and  θp): 
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=  σcσpρc  ,  (9) 
0 0 0  σ2  0 d 
σaσpρa  σbσpρb  σcσpρc  0  σ2 
p 
where  σk  is  the  coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  θk  (note  that  the  mean  of  θk  is  one),  ρ  is  the 
correlation  coeﬃcient,  0  <  ρab  <  ρac,  and  0  <  ρb  <  ρc.  We  also  assume  that  the  magnitudes 
of  σj  (j  =  a, b, c, d)  are  not  very  diﬀerent.  By  inserting  (8)  and  (9)  into  the  ﬁrst  order 
condition  (5),  we  obtain  a  system  of  equations,  based  on  which  we  conduct  the  comparative­
static  analysis.  Since  the  system  cannot  be  analyzed  without  additional  restrictions,  we 
investigate  the  simplest  case  for  which  it  is  possible  to  obtain  analytical  results  and  which  is 
useful  to  understand  the  risk­aversion  mechanism  underlying  the  optimal  labor  choice.  More 
¯ concretely,  we  assume  that  ∂fj/∂L  =  ∂fj/∂(�jL) =  w,  i.e.,  labor  returns  are  linear  and  their 
expected  values  are  the  same  across  sectors.  With  this  speciﬁcation,  the  household  income 
becomes 
¯  y  =  y0  +  wL{�aθa  +  �bθb  +  �cθc  +  (1  − �a  − �b  − �c)θd}.  (10) 
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Inserting  (8)  into  (5)  and  re­arranging,  we  obtain

E vy  1 − ψ
y  − y 
+  s(ψ  − η)
p − p 
(θk  − θd)  = 0, k  =  a, b, c.  (11) 
y	 p 
We  then  insert  (9)  and  (10)  into  the  expression  above.  After  re­arranging,  we  obtain 
three  equations: 
s��
=Σaa  =Σab  =Σac �  �� � �  ��  � �  ��  �  � ��� � � 
d)+�b  (σaσbρab  +  σ2  +  σ2 
d �a  (σ2  +  σ2	




σaσpρa, a  wL  ψ 
=Σbb  =Σbc � �� � �  �� �  �  � 
�a(σaσbρab  +  σ2 
d)+�c  (σbσcρbc  +  σ2 
d) +  �b  (σb 
2  +  σ2	




σbσpρb, d  wL  ψ 
=Σcc � �� �  � � 
+  σ2	
d) +  �c  (σ2  +  σ2 �a(σaσcρac  d) +  �b(σbσcρbc  +  σ2 




σcσpρc, c d  wL  ψ 
¯ where  y ¯ =  y0  +wL,  which  does  not  depend  on  the  portfolio  choice.  For  this  reason,  we  treat 
ys(1  − η/ψ)/(wL)  by  s��.  Therefore,  the  above  system  can  be  it  as  a  parameter  and  replace  ¯ ¯ 
expressed  as  ⎛	 ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛  ⎞ 
Σaa  Σab  Σac  �a  σ2  +  s��σaσpρa 
⎜	 ⎟⎜  ⎟ ⎜  σ
d 
2  ⎟ 
⎝  Σab  Σbb  Σbc  ⎠⎝  �b  ⎠  =  ⎝	 d  +  s��σbσpρb  ⎠, 
d Σac  Σbc  Σcc  �c  σ2  +  s��σcσpρc 
which  can  be  solved  to  obtain  a  closed­form  solution.  Letting  D  denote  the  determinant  of 




we  obtain  the  following  closed­form  solution: 
⎡  =Ra 
1  ⎢
� 
�a  =  ⎣σ2 
bc) +  (ΣbcΣac  − ΣabΣcc) +  (ΣabΣbc  − ΣbbΣac)} d{(ΣbbΣcc  − Σ2 
D 
⎤ 
+s��σp{σaρa(ΣbbΣcc  − Σ2	 ⎥ 
bc) +  σbρb(ΣbcΣac  − ΣabΣcc) +  σcρc(ΣabΣbc  − ΣacΣbb)  ⎦,  (12) 
=Qa 
⎡  =Rb 
1  ⎢
� 
d{(ΣbcΣac  − ΣabΣcc ) +  (ΣaaΣcc  − Σ2 �b  =  ⎣σ2	
ac) +  (ΣabΣac  − ΣaaΣbc)}
D 
⎤ 
ac) +  σcρc(ΣabΣac  − ΣaaΣbc)  ⎦,  (13) +s��σp{σaρa(ΣacΣbc  − ΣabΣcc) +  σbρb(ΣaaΣcc  − Σ2	 ⎥ 
=Qb 
⎡  =Rc 
1  ⎢
� 
�c  =  ⎣σ2	
ab)} d{(ΣabΣbc  − ΣacΣbb) +  (ΣacΣab  − ΣaaΣbc) +  (ΣaaΣbb  − Σ2 
D 
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)}⎦,  (14) +s��σp{σaρa(ΣabΣbc  − ΣacΣbb) +  σbρb(ΣabΣac  − ΣaaΣbc) +  σcρc(ΣaaΣbb  − Σ2  ⎥ 
=Qc 
�  1  � �

�d  = 1 −  �i  = 1 −  σ2

d(Ra  +  Rb  +  Rc) +  s��σp(Qa  +  Qb  +  Qc)  .  (15)
D 
i=a,b,c 
Now  we  investigate  the  comparative  statics  with  respect  to  σa.  First,  a  numerical 
y/(wL)  at  1/0.8,  η  at  0.4,  ψ  at  2.0,  example  is  shown  in  Figure  A.1,  where  we  set  s  at  0.5,  ¯ ¯ 
ρab  at  0.1,  ρac  at  0.2,  ρbc  at  0.4,  ρa  at  ­0.05,  ρb  at  0.1,  ρc  at  0.2,  σb,  σc,  σd  and  σp  at  0.5.  The 
ﬁgure  clearly  supports  the  three  predictions  in  (7):  As  self­employed  farming  becomes  riskier, 
the  own­farm  labor  supply  (�a)  declines,  the  labor  supply  share  to  agricultural  wage  work 
paid  in  kind  (�c)  increases  more  rapidly  than  that  to  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash 
(�b),  and  the  labor  supply  share  to  non­agricultural  wage  work  (�d)  increases  more  rapidly 
than  that  to  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  cash  (�b). 
A.I.1  Impact  of  Farm  Income  Risk  on  the  Farm  Labor  Share 
Since  the  shape  of  Figure  A.1  is  contingent  on  our  speciﬁc  choice  of  parameters,  we  examine 
the  robustness  of  this  shape  in  the  followings.  For  simplicity’s  sake,  in  what  follows,  we 
assume  that  all  the  variances  of  risk  factors  are  equal  in  order  to  focus  on  the  eﬀect  of  the 
covariances  between  risk  factors. 
Regarding  the  impact  of  farm  income  risk  on  the  farm  labor  share,  we  take  the  partial 
derivative  of  (12)  and  obtain 
∂�a  1 
σ2 ∂Ra  �a  ∂D 
= +  s��σp 
∂Qa  .  (16)
∂σa  D  d  ∂σa  ∂σa 
− 
D ∂σa 
In  general,  the  sign  of  the  above  expression  is  indeterminate.  However,  with  some 
additional  assumptions,  we  can  show  that  ∂�a/∂σa  <  0.  First, 
∂Ra  = Σbcσcρac  − Σcc σbρab  +  Σbcσbρab  − Σbbσcρac ∂σa 
=  σbρab(Σbc  − Σcc) +  σcρac (Σbc  − Σbb)  < 0. 
since  ρbc  <  1  &  σb  ≈ σc 
Second, 
∂Qa  =  ρa(ΣbbΣcc  − Σ2 
bc) +  σbρb(σcρacΣbc  − σbρabΣcc) +  σcρc(σbρabΣbc  − σcρacΣbb)
∂σa 
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ρa(Σ2 
bc) +  σb
2{ρac(ρbΣbc  − ρcΣbb) +  ρab(ρcΣbc  − ρbΣbb)} ����  bb  − Σ2 ≈
since	σb  ≈ σc

< ρa(Σ2 
bc) +  σb
2Σbb{ρac(ρb  − ρc) +  ρab(ρc  − ρb)}
 ����  bb  − Σ2

since  ρbc  <  1

=  ρa(Σ2 
bc) +  σb
2Σbb{(ρac  − ρab)(ρb  − ρc)} bb  − Σ2 
< ρa(Σ2  < 0. ����  bb  − Σ2 
bc)  ����

since  ρac  >  ρab  &  ρc  >  ρb  if  ρa  <  0

Note  that  ∂Qa/∂σa  is  more  likely  to  be  negative  when  ρa  <  0,  i.e.,  when  farmers  enjoy  a 
higher  gross  income  from  crops,  the  food  price  tends  to  be  lower,  which  seems  to  ﬁt  the 
situations  in  rural  India.  The  assumption  of  the  negative  correlation  between  farm  income 
and  food  price,  ρa  <  0,  is  not  necessary  to  show  our  predictions  in  (7),  however.  We  can 
obtain  a  similar  conclusion  if  ρa  is  positive  but  suﬃciently  small.  And  third, 
∂D 
=	 2σaΣbbΣcc  +  2σbρabΣac Σbc  +  2σcρac ΣabΣbc  − 2σaΣ2 
bc  − 2σcρacΣac Σbb  − 2σbρabΣabΣcc ∂σa  � �	 � �  � �
Σ2 
= 2σaΣbbΣcc  1 −  bc  − 2σbρabΣabΣcc  1 − 
ΣacΣbc  − 2σcρacΣacΣbb  1 − 
ΣabΣbc 
ΣbbΣcc  ΣabΣcc  ΣacΣbb 
� �	 � �  � �
Σ2 
bc	 ΣabΣbc 
bb  1 − 
Σ2  − 2σbρabΣabΣbb  1 − 
ΣacΣbc  − 2σbρacΣacΣbb  1 − ≈	 2σbΣ2 
bb  ΣabΣbb  ΣacΣbb 
since  σa  ≈ σb  ≈ σc  � � �	 � �� 
Σ2 
bc >	 2σbΣbb  Σbb  1 − 
Σ2  − (ρabΣab  +  ρacΣac ) 1 − 
ΣabΣbc 
���� 
bb  Σac Σbb

since  ρac  >  ρab

Σ2 
bc 2σbΣbb(Σbb  − ρabΣab  − ρacΣac) 1 − 
Σ2  > 0. ����	 ���� ≥	
bb 1 1 &  ρac ρbc  ≤ 2ρab  if  ρab,  ρac  < if  ρac ,  ρbc  ≤ 2 2 
Note  that  ∂D/∂σa  is  more  likely  to  be  positive  when  σa  >  σb  (σc),  which  seems  to  ﬁt  the 
situations  in  rural  India,  but  as  shown  above,  even  in  the  case  of  σa  ≈ σb  (σc),  it  becomes 
positive  if  the  correlation  coeﬃcients  are  suﬃciently  small  to  satisfy  ρac  <  1/2,  ρbc  ≤ 1/2  and 
ρacρbc/2  ≤ ρab  <  1/2.  Thus,  we  obtain  the  relation  ∂�a/∂σa  <  0,  which  predicts  that  the 
own­farm  labor  supply  declines  as  production  becomes  riskier.  A  corollary  of  this  prediction 
is  ∂(�b  +  �c  +  �d)/∂σa  >  0,  which  predicts  that  the  sum  of  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  shares 
increases  as  self­employed  farming  becomes  riskier. 
A.I.2  Impact  of  Farm  Income  Risk  on  Labor  Supply  to  Oﬀ­Farm  Sectors 
Now  we  investigate  which  among  the  three  oﬀ­farm  sectors  expands  most  rapidly  when  self­
employed  farming  becomes  riskier.  First,  we  examine  the  choice  between  agricultural  wage 
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work  paid  in  cash  and  agricultural  wage  work  paid  in  kind.  Taking  the  partial  derivatives  of 
(13)  and  (14),  we  obtain 
� � � �  �� 
∂�c  ∂�b  1 
σ2  ∂Rc  ∂Rb  +  s��σp 
∂Qc  ∂Qb  (�c  − �b) ∂D 





D  ∂σa 
− 




D  ∂σa 
The  sign  of  the  above  expression  depends  on  the  signs  of  ∂(Rc  − Rb)/∂σa,  ∂(Qc  − Qb)/∂σa, 
�c  − �b,  and  ∂D/∂σa.  As  shown  for  the  case  of  ∂�a/∂σa,  it  is  likely  that  ∂D/∂σa  >  0. 
Furthermore, 




+(σaρabσbΣcc  − σaρabσbΣbc) +  (σaρacσcΣbb  − σaρacσcΣbc)} 
+ρbσb{2(−σaΣcc  +  σcρacΣac) 
+2σaσbσc(−ρbc  +  ρabρac) +  σ2 
d(−2σa  +  σbρab  +  σcρac)} 
+ρcσc{2(σaΣbb  − σbρabΣab) 
+2σaσbσc(ρbc  − ρabρac) +  σ2 
d(2σa  − σbρab  − σcρac)} 
> −ρa{(ΣacΣbb  − ΣabΣcc)+(ΣbcΣac  − ΣabΣbc) ����  �  �� � �  �� � 
since  ρab  <  ρac  >0  >0 
+(σaρabσbΣcc  − σaρabσbΣbc)+(σaρacσcΣbb  − σaρacσcΣbc)
�  �� � �  �� �
} 
>0  >0 
+(ρcσc  − ρbσb){2(σaΣbb  − σbρabΣab)
�  �� � �  ��  � 
>0  >0 
+2σaσbσc(ρbc  − ρabρac) +  σ2 
d  (2σa  − σbρab  − σcρac )}. 
>0 
Therefore,  if  we  additionally  assume  that  ρa  <  0  and  the  correlation  between  cash  and  in­
kind  wages  in  agricultural  labor  market  is  moderately  high  so  that  ρbc  >  ρabρac,  which  seems 
plausible  in  the  context  of  rural  India,  we  can  assign  the  sign  of  ∂(Qc  − Qb)/∂σa  as  positive. 
Thus,  when  �c  ≤ �b  and  ∂(Rc  − Rb)/∂σa  ≥ 0,  we  obtain  the  relation  ∂(�c  − �b)/∂σa  >  0, 
which  predicts  that  the  labor  supply  share  to  wage  work  paid  in  kind  increases  more  rapidly 
than  that  to  wage  work  paid  in  cash,  as  self­employed  farming  becomes  riskier.  When 
�c  >  �b  or  ∂(Rc  − Rb)/∂σa  <  0,  the  sign  of  ∂(�c  − �b)/∂σa  is  indeterminate,  although  it  is 
more  likely  to  be  positive  when  s��  is  large,  i.e.,  the  household’s  food  budget  share  is  high, 
the  household  is  highly  risk  averse,  and  the  household’s  food  demand  is  inelastic.  In  the 
numerical  simulation,  the  positive  eﬀect  of  ∂(Qc  − Qb)/∂σa  is  dominant,  although  (�c  − �b) 
is  positive  and  ∂(Rc  − Rb)/∂σa  is  negative. 
19 Finally,  we  investigate  the  choice  between  agricultural  and  non­agricultural  wage  work. 
From  (13)  and  (15),  we  obtain 
� � � �  �� 
∂�d  ∂�b  1 
σ2  ∂Ra  ∂Rb  ∂Rc  ∂Qa  − 2












+  s��σp  − 
∂σa  ∂σa 
− 
∂σa 
�a  +  2�b  +  �c  ∂D 
+  . 
D  ∂σa 
We  already  showed  that  the  combination  of  ∂Ra/∂σa  <  0,  ∂Qa/∂σa  <  0,  and  ∂D/∂σa  >  0 
is  likely.  Therefore,  when  the  absolute  values  of  ∂Rb/∂σa  ≈ ∂Rc/∂σa  are  small  and  the  ab­
solute  values  of  ∂Qb/∂σa  and  ∂Qc/∂σa  are  small,  we  expect  the  relation  ∂(�d  − �b)/∂σa  >  0, 
which  predicts  that  the  labor  supply  share  to  non­agricultural  wage  work  increases  more 
rapidly  than  that  to  agricultural  wage  work,  as  self­employed  farming  becomes  riskier.  This 
relation  also  holds  in  cases  where  σ2  and  s�� are  suﬃciently  small.  Regarding  Figure  A.1,  we  d 
observe  the  relation  ∂(�d  − �b)/∂σa  >  0  because  the  absolute  values  of  ∂Rb/∂σa,  ∂Rc/∂σa, 
∂Qb/∂σa,  and  ∂Qc/∂σa  are  small.  Note  that  in  typical  situations  in  developing  countries,  s�� 
is  not  very  small,  because  the  household’s  food  budget  share  is  high,  the  household  is  highly 
risk  averse,  and  the  household’s  food  demand  is  inelastic. 
Appendix  II:  Robustness  Checks 
In  this  appendix,  we  conduct  several  robustness  checks  of  our  main  result  shown  in  Table 
5.  Table  A­1  shows  the  estimation  results  under  alternative  speciﬁcations:  with  village  and 
district  characteristics  excluded  (column  1),  with  district  characteristics  excluded  (column 
2),  and  with  no  adjustment  for  the  possible  correlation  between  errors  (column  4).  Column 
3  of  the  table  repeats  our  main  result  reported  in  Table  5  for  the  comparison  purpose. 
Comparing  columns  1,  2,  and  3,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  signs  and  the  statistical  signiﬁcance  of 
the  estimated  coeﬃcients  on  risk  factors  are  essentially  unchanged,  but  the  absolute  values 
of  the  coeﬃcients  become  larger  as  we  include  more  village­ or  district­level  control  variables. 
This  seems  to  suggest  that  the  impacts  of  risk  factors  are  likely  to  be  underestimated  when 
heterogeneity  across  villages  or  districts  is  ignored.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ignorance  of  the 
correlation  between  errors  (column  4)  does  not  change  the  magnitudes  of  the  coeﬃcients 




While  the  likelihood  ratio  (LR)  χ2  statistics  in  the  last  row  of  the  table  indicate  the  re­
jection  of  all  three  alternative  speciﬁcations,  this  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  suspicion  of 
omitted  variable  bias  in  our  main  result.  For  instance,  it  is  possible  that  the  districts  are  dif­
ferent  in  terms  of  labor  market  conditions  and  this  heterogeneity  is  not  controlled  adequately 
in  our  main  result.  In  order  to  show  that  this  possibility  is  not  high,  we  further  estimate 
the  labor  supply  model  with  district  dummies  included,  instead  of  district  characteristics 
and  rainfall  variables.  If  the  coeﬃcients  on  household­level  and  village­level  variables  change 
substantially  from  our  main  result,  a  suspicion  of  omitted  variable  bias  could  be  raised.  By 
using  a  Wald  test,  we  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coeﬃcient  estimates  in  our  main 
result  and  those  in  the  regression  with  district  dummies  are  equal.  The  χ2  statistics  are 
7.71,  7.34,  13.99,  and  3.74  for  each  equation,  indicating  that  the  diﬀerence  in  the  estimates 
is  not  statistically  signiﬁcant.5  Thus,  we  expect  the  omitted  variable  bias  to  be  rather  small, 
even  if  unobserved  heterogeneity  exists  across  districts. 
Appendix  III:  Simulation  Procedure 
In  this  appendix,  we  explain  the  simulation  procedure  used  to  obtain  the  results  reported  in 
Table  6.  We  follow  the  procedure  outlined  by  Cornick  et  al.  (1994). 
First,  we  simulate  T  runs  of  a  (4×1)  vector  of  error  terms  u  using  Cholesky  factorization 
of  the  covariance  matrix  � Σ  estimated  by  the  multivariate  tobit  model: 
ut  =  LSt,  (17) 
E[ut] =  LE[St] = 0,  (18) 
V  [ut] =  LV  [St]L� =  LIL� = Σ,  (19) 
where  St  is  a  (4 × 1)  vector  of  random  numbers  obtained  from  a  univariate  standard  normal 
distribution  in  the  t­th  trial,  and  L  is  a  lower  triangular  matrix  deﬁned  in  the  last  equation 
of  (19).  Then  for  each  run,  we  assign  each  observation  (household)  to  a  pattern  of  labor 
allocation  shown  in  Table  1,  and  obtain  the  following  two  pattern  vectors,  both  of  which  are 
The  degree  of  freedom  is  22  (there  are  15  household­level  variables  and  7  village­level  variables).  The 
estimation  results  with  district  dummies  are  available  on  request. 
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4 × 1  (U:  uncensored  and  C:  censored  at  the  upper  limit): 
⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ 
1[100  − Xβ �
a  >  � ua,t  >  −Xβ �
a]  Ua,t 
.  . ⎜
⎜
⎝ 











� Pr( 0) � > d  ˜ � Pr(100  >  �d  >  0)  +  ˜ � Pr(�d  ≥ 100) 
In  addition,  the  expected  labor  supply  share  is  given  by 
E[�k]  =  0 × Pr(˜ �k  ≤ 0)  +  E[˜ �k|100  >  ˜ �k  >  0]  × Pr(100  >  ˜ �k  >  0)  +  100  × Pr(˜ �k  ≥ 100) 
=  {Xβk  +  E[uk|100  >  ˜ �k  >  0]} × Pr(100  >  ˜ �k  >  0)  +  100  × Pr(˜ �k  ≥ 100),  k  =  a, b, c, d. 










 Ut  =  .
 .

1[100  − Xβ �
d  >  � ud,t  >  −Xβ �
d
⎞ 
]  Ud,t 
















 Ct  = 
1[� ud,t  ≥ 100  − Xβ �
d]  Cd,t 
where  1[·] is  an  indicator  function  that  takes  unity  if  the  condition  in  the  bracket  is  true  and 
zero  otherwise,  X  is  the  vector  of  explanatory  variables,  and  β �
k  is  the  vector  of  estimated 
coeﬃcients  in  the  equation  k  (k  =  a:  self­employment  in  agriculture,  b:  wage  work  in 
agriculture  paid  in  cash,  c:  wage  work  in  agriculture  paid  in  kind,  d:  wage  work  in  non­
agriculture). 
Using  these  pattern  vectors  and  letting  � ˜ k  denote  the  latent  and  uncensored  variable  for 
the  labor  share,  we  approximate  the  probabilities  that  a  household  allocates  labor  to  each 
type  of  work  by  the  followings. 
T T ⎞
˜ � Pr( ˜ � Pr(100  > 
⎛ 
�a  >  0)  +  �a  ≥ 100) 
⎞ ⎛ 







t=1  t=1 .  .  . 
.  .  (20)
 =  = .  .  T 
and  � �k  ≥ 100)  in  equation  (20),  and  the  expected  value  of  error  terms  conditional  on  being  Pr(˜
uncensored  deﬁned  by 
T
ukUk,t 




Note  that  the  reported  ﬁgures  in  Table  6  are  the  mean  predicted  values  when  T  is  set 
to  50.6 
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Table  1:  Labor  Allocation  Patterns  in  Bihar  and  Uttar  Pradesh,  India

Pattern  No.  Freq.  Pattern  No.  Freq. 
(A)  Self­employment  only  (D)  Self­emp.  non­agric.  and  wage  work 
(a)  only  353  21.1%  (b)  and  (e)  1  0.1% 
(e)  only  16  1.0%  (c)  and  (e)  5  0.3% 
(a)  and  (e)  322  19.3%  (d)  and  (e)  12  0.7% 
Sub­total  of  (A)  691  41.4%  (b),  (c),  and  (e)  7  0.4% 
(b),  (d),  and  (e)  3  0.2% 
(B)  Wage  work  only  (c),  (d),  and  (e)  6  0.4% 
(b)  only  7  0.4%  (b),  (c),  (d),  and  (e)  4  0.2% 
(c)  only  10  0.6%  Sub­total  of  (D)  38  2.3% 
(d)  only  38  2.3% 
(b)  and  (c)  12  0.7%  (E)  Other 
(b)  and  (d)  7  0.4%  (a),  (b),  and  (e)  7  0.4% 
(c)  and  (d)  12  0.7%  (a),  (c),  and  (e)  16  1.0% 
(b),  (c),  and  (d)  10  0.6%  (a),  (d),  and  (e)  123  7.4% 
Sub­total  of  (B)  96  5.7%  (a),  (b),  (c),  and  (e)  17  1.0% 
(a),  (b),  (d),  and  (e)  19  1.1% 
(C)  Self­emp.  agric.  and  wage  work  (a),  (c),  (d),  and  (e)  19  1.1% 
(a)  and  (b)  31  1.9%  (a),  (b),  (c),  (d),  and  (e)  36  2.2% 
(a)  and  (c)  15  0.9%  Sub­total  of  (E)  237  14.2% 
(a)  and  (d)  332  19.9% 
(a),  (b),  and  (c)  45  2.7%  Including  (a)  1520  91.0% 
(a),  (b),  and  (d)  30  1.8%  Including  (b)  or  (c)  474  28.4% 
(a),  (c),  and  (d)  52  3.1%  Including  (d)  806  48.3% 
(a),  (b),  (c),  and  (d)  103  6.2%  Including  (b),  (c),  or  (d)  979  58.6% 
Sub­total  of  (C)  608  36.4%  Grand  total  (A­E)  1670  100.0% 
Notes:(a)  =  Self­employment  in  agriculture;  (b)  =  Wage  work  in  agriculture  paid  in  cash; 
(c)  =  Wage  work  in  agriculture  paid  in  kind;  (d)  =  Wage  work  in  non­agriculture;  (e)  = 
Self­employment  in  non­agriculture. 
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Table  2:  Household  Characteristics  by  Labor  Allocation  Pattern

No.  of  Lower  Annual  labor  No.  of 
obs.  caste(1)  supply(2)  working 
(%)  (hours)  members(2) 
Total  1670  81.14  3240.67  2.43 
Labor  allocation  pattern: 
Self­employment  only  691  74.24  2623.76  2.09 
Including  (b)  or  (c)  474  96.84  3503.16  2.71 
Including  (d)  806  83.62  3851.89  2.74 
Size  of  farmland 
No.  of  No.  of  non­ owned  by  the 
working  age  working  age  household 
members(2)  members(2)  (acres) 
Total  3.60  3.06  2.71 
Labor  allocation  pattern: 
Self­employment  only  3.48  2.97  3.74 
Including  (b)  or  (c)  3.15  3.05  1.23 
Including  (d)  3.88  3.21  2.17 
Note:  (1)  The  share  of  households  belonging  neither  to  middle  or  upper  Hindu  caste. 
(2)  Reported  ﬁgures  are  the  averages  for  all  households.  ‘Annual  labor  supply’  is  the  sum 
of  hours  working  on  own  farm,  hours  supplied  to  wage  work  outside,  and  hours  working  on 
own  non­farm  enterprise. Working  age  members  are  deﬁned  as  those  aged  between  15  and 
60. 
26 Table  3:  The  Eﬀects  of  Rainfall  on  Rice  Production  and  Market  Wages

Rice  production  Agric.  wages  Non­agric.  wages 
Land  under  paddy  60.308  (9.34)***  ­ ­
Rainfall  11.278  (3.38)***  2.45  (1.83)*  0.42  (0.24) 
Intercept  172.408  (70.75)***  18.45  (8.57)***  39.44  (13.88)*** 
No.  of  obs.  199  95  96 
R  square  0.77  0.61  0.53 
Notes:  (1)  Standardized  coeﬃcients  are  reported  and  numbers  in  parentheses  are  t­values. 
(2)  District  ﬁxed  eﬀects  are  included  in  all  of  the  three  models.  In  the  regressions  of  market 
wages,  year  dummies  (the  reference  period is  1990)  are  included  in  order  to  control  ﬂuctuation 
in  prices. 
(3)  The  units  of  dependent  variables  are  1,000  metric  tons  (rice  production)  and  rupees 
(market  wages). 
(4)  Agricultural  and  non­agricultural  wages  are  the  annual  average  daily  wages  paid  to 
plowmen  and  carpenters,  respectively. 
27
Table  4:  Summary  Statistics  of  Regression  Variables 
Variable  Unit  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Dependent  variables:  Labor  hour  shares  (�j) 
(a)  Self­emp.,  agriculture  %  44.43  36.21  0  100 
(b)  Wage  work,  agric.  (cash)  %  5.59  15.60  0  100 
(c)  Wage  work,  agric.  (in­kind)  %  6.74  16.77  0  100 
(d)  Wage  work,  non­agric.  %  25.50  32.38  0  100 
(e)  Self­emp.,  non­agric.  %  17.75  28.98  0  100 
Explanatory  variables:  Household  characteristics  (X) 
Land  owned(1)  acre  2.71  4.76  0  93 
Irrigation  ratio(1)  %  80.00  32.74  0  100 
Agric.  capital  Rs.  7367.34  31149.75  0  373600 
Livestock  Rs.  7228.88  9707.77  0  150000 
Education(2)  year  3.51  3.59  0  18.5 
Working­age  males  person  1.89  1.17  0  8 
Working­age  females  person  1.71  1.06  0  7 
Non­working­age  members  person  3.06  2.17  0  17 
Dummy  for  land  owner(1)  ­ 0.95 
Caste  dummies  (‘Upper’  as  the  reference  category) 
Middle  ­ 0.02 
Agric.­based  backward  ­ 0.32 
Other  backward  ­ 0.18 
Scheduled  ­ 0.22 
Muslim  upper  ­ 0.04 
Muslim  backward  ­ 0.04 
Explanatory  variables:  Aggregate  risk  factors  (σa) 
CV  of  rainfall(3)  ­ 0.29  0.07  0.13  0.39 
Rainfall  shock(3)  mm  ­25.94  64.43  ­166.89  57.04 
Explanatory  variables:  Village  characteristics 
Irrigation  indicator(4)  ­ 3.80  1.19  1  5 
Distance  to  facilities  km  5.97  3.61  0.5  20 
Ratio  of  landless  %  38.77  21.19  0  99 
Road  indicator(4)  ­ 2.75  0.99  1  4 
Electricity  dummy  ­ 0.54 
Agric.  wage  Rs.  24.62  7.31  7  40 
Non­agric.  wage  Rs.  64.68  13.90  20  99 
Note:  (1)  The  sample  comprises  farm  households,  including  pure  tenant  farmers  who  do  not  own 
land.  ‘Land  owned’  is  the  size  of  farmland  owned  by  the  household.  ‘Dummy  for  land  owner’  is  based 
on  ‘Land  owned’.  ‘Irrigation  ratio’  is  the  size  of  irrigated  land  owned  by  the  household  divided  by 
‘Land  owned’. 
(2)  ‘Education’  is  the  average  number  of  schooling  years  among  working­age  adults. 
(3)  The  coeﬃcient  of  variation  (‘CV  of  rainfall’)  was  calculated  based  on  ten­year  rainfall  data  at 
district­level  (1990­1999).  ‘Rainfall  shock’  was  calculated  as  the  deviation  of  annual  rainfall  in  1997, 
the  year  of  the  LSMS  survey,  from  the  ten­year  average. 
(4)  ‘Irrigation  indicator’  is  an  indicator  variable  based  on  the  village­level  irrigation  ratio  (the  size 
of  irrigated  farmland  divided  by  the  size  of  total  farmland  in  the  village),  taking  1  (0%),  2  (1­25%), 
3  (26­50%),  4  (51­75%),  and  5  (above).  ‘Road  indicator’  is  an  indicator  variable  characterizing  the 
main  road  in  the  village,  taking  1  (trail),  2  (dirt  road),  3  (paved  road),  and  4  (tar­paved  road). 
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Table  5:  Determinants  of  Labor  Supply 
(a)  Self­emp.,  (b)  Wage  work,  (c)  Wage  work,  (d)  Wage  work, 
agriculture  agriculture  agriculture  non­agriculture 
paid  in  cash  paid  in  kind 
Household  characteristics  (X) 
Land  owned  2.21  (2.15)**  ­3.38  (2.51)**  ­5.24  (4.28)***  ­2.03  (1.96)** 
Irrigation  ratio  0.12  (1.88)*  ­0.18  (2.89)***  ­0.05  (0.86)  0.01  (0.12) 
Agric.  capital×10−4  ­0.28  (0.49) 
Livestock  ×10−4  5.20  (1.83)* 
Education  ­0.19  (0.33) 
­5.77  (1.53) 
­2.57  (0.88) 
­2.05  (3.24)*** 
0.72  (0.52) 
­3.96  (1.65)* 
­2.58  (3.16)*** 
­2.19  (2.38)** 
­6.61  (2.51)** 
0.81  (1.25) 
Working­age  males  ­5.69  (4.20)***  ­3.27  (1.82)*  ­1.71  (0.97)  11.18  (5.33)*** 
Working­age  females  0.09  (0.05)  3.59  (1.62)  ­0.44  (0.27)  1.79  (0.93) 
Non­working­age  members  ­1.95  (2.98)***  1.67  (3.33)***  1.41  (1.87)*  1.20  (1.26) 
Dummy  for  land  owner  8.13  (1.31)  ­7.13  (1.01)  ­17.09  (2.17)**  ­3.70  (0.38) 
Caste  dummies 
Middle  ­14.92  (1.91)*  6.90  (0.43)  19.94  (1.06)  ­13.39  (0.96) 
Agric.­based  backward  3.71  (0.78)  17.47  (2.85)***  29.89  (2.96)***  ­8.30  (1.08) 
Other  backward  ­15.03  (3.19)***  15.01  (1.92)*  41.43  (4.22)***  4.51  (0.55) 
Scheduled  ­22.46  (4.26)***  40.46  (6.20)***  65.38  (6.21)***  5.72  (0.75) 
Muslim  upper  ­16.04  (2.15)**  13.65  (1.02)  26.69  (2.02)**  12.03  (0.93) 
Muslim  backward  ­25.69  (4.41)***  6.77  (0.84)  17.59  (1.69)*  ­3.13  (0.27) 
Aggregate  risk  factors  (σa) 
CV  of  rainfall×102  ­2.25  (4.66)*** 
Rainfall  shock×10−2  ­7.63  (1.37) 
Other  controls 
­0.47  (1.06) 
16.15  (2.40)** 
0.97  (2.45)** 
­5.87  (0.93) 
1.86  (2.79)*** 
3.11  (0.34) 
Irrigation  indicator  0.04  (0.03)  2.57  (1.08)  2.32  (1.18)  ­1.69  (0.80) 
Distance  to  facilities/10  ­1.12  (2.30)**  0.92  (1.37)  0.26  (0.40)  0.46  (0.65) 
Ratio  of  landless  ­0.20  (3.09)***  0.34  (3.09)***  0.27  (2.64)***  ­0.02  (0.21) 
Road  indicator  ­3.50  (2.23)**  1.92  (0.79)  ­2.37  (1.43)  3.46  (1.36) 
Electricity  dummy  ­2.11  (0.87)  ­1.69  (0.30)  ­1.63  (0.41)  ­8.64  (1.31) 
Agric.  wage  ­0.41  (1.51)  ­0.16  (0.47)  ­0.14  (0.38)  0.51  (1.03) 
Non­agric.  wage  ­0.22  (1.27)  0.26  (1.54)  0.26  (1.97)**  0.48  (2.37)** 
Intercept  178.55  (5.89)***  ­61.73  (1.61)  ­67.90  (2.00)**  ­128.57  (2.76)*** 
sigma  43.39  (23.83)***  45.41  (10.37)***  42.32  (9.79)***  60.27  (17.04)*** 
correlation  1.00  ­0.40  (8.82)***  ­0.52  (9.72)***  ­0.66  (33.03)*** 
1.00  0.42  (7.09)***  0.05  (1.19) 
1.00  0.17  (2.97)*** 
1.00 
Note:  (1)  Estimated  using  a  multivariate  two­limit  tobit  model  (censored  at  0  and  100)  with  Geweke­
Hajvassiliou­Keane  (GHK)  simulator  (No.  of  draws  =  50). 
(2)  Additional  regressors  include  district  characteristics,  such  as  average  rainfall,  population,  density, 
and  literacy  rate,  and  UP  state  dummy.  Coeﬃcient  estimates  on  these  variables  have  been  dropped 
for  brevity  but  are  available  on  request. 
(3)  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  z­values  based  on  clustering­robust  standard  errors  using  districts  as 
clusters. 
(4)  No.  of  obs.  =  1670;  Log­likelihood  =  ­15219.81. 
(5)  H0:  no  correlation  between  errors;  LR  χ2(6)  =  943.29  (P­value  = 0.00). 
29 Table  6:  Labor  Supply  Simulation 
A.  Simulation  of  Wage­Labor  Market  Participation 
(b)  Wage  work,  (c)  Wage  work,  (d)  Wage  work,  Wage  work, 
agriculture  agriculture  non­agriculture  any  type 
paid  in  cash  paid  in  kind 
Pr(�b  > 0)  Pr(�c  > 1)  Pr(�d  > 0)  Pr(�b  +  �c  +  �d  >  0) 
This  paper 
CV  of  rainfall  =  0.13(Min.)  0.23  0.12  0.26  0.49 
CV  of  rainfall  =  0.39(Max.)  0.17  0.25  0.64  0.77 
Sample  mean  0.21  0.15  0.52  0.59 
Rose  (2001),  Table3 
CV  of  rainfall  =  0.16(Min.)  ­ ­ ­ 0.32 
CV  of  rainfall  =  0.91(Max.)  ­ ­ ­ 0.51 
Sample  mean  ­ ­ ­ 0.38 
B.  Simulation  of  Labor  Supply  Shares 
(a)  Self­emp., 
agriculture 
(b)  Wage  work, 
agriculture 
(c)  Wage  work, 
agriculture 
(d)  Wage  work, 
non­agriculture 
paid  in  cash  paid  in  kind 
E(�a)  E(�b)  E(�c)  E(�d) 
CV  of  rainfall  =  0.13(Min.) 
CV  of  rainfall  =  0.39(Max.) 













Note:  (1)  Pr(�j  > 0)  =  Pr(0  < �j  < 100)  +  Pr(�j  =  100)  and  E(�j) =  Pr(0  < �j  < 100)  × E(�j 0  < 
�j  < 100)  +  100  × Pr(�j  =  100).  See  Appendix  III  for  the  simulation  procedure. 
|
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Table  7:  Speciﬁcation  Tests  for  the  Labor  Supply  Mode 
(a)  Self­emp.,  (b)  Wage  work,  (c)  Wage  work,  (d)  Wage  work, 
Agriculture  agriculture  agriculture  non­agriculture 
paid  in  cash  paid  in  kind 
Without  any  restriction  (Table  5) 
CV  of  rainfall×102  ­2.25 
Rainfall  shock×10−2  ­7.63 















With  a  restriction  that  all  coeﬃcients  in  equations  (b)  and  (c)  are  equal. 
CV  of  rainfall×102 













Log­likelihood  =  ­15254.67.  H0:  the  restricted  model  is  true;  LR  χ2(29)  =  69.73  (P­value  =  0.00) 
With  a  restriction  that  all  coeﬃcients  in  equations  (b),  (c),  and  (d)  are  equal. 
CV  of  rainfall×102  ­2.02  (5.04)***  0.86  (3.38)*** 
Rainfall  shock×10−2  ­7.10  (1.50)  1.96  (0.37) 
Log­likelihood  =  ­15254.67,  H0:  the  restricted  model  is  true;  LR  χ2(58)  =  329.99  (P­value  =  0.00) 
Note:  (1)  Estimated  using  a  multivariate  two­limit  tobit  model  (censored  at  0  and  100)  with  Geweke­
Hajvassiliou­Keane  (GHK)  simulator  (No.  of  draws  =  50). 
(2)  All  regressions  are  implemented  with  other  variables  included,  such  as  household,  village,  and 
district  characteristics.  Coeﬃcient  estimates  on  these  variables  have  been  dropped  for  brevity  but 
are  available  on  request. 
(3)  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  z­values  based  on  clustering­robust  standard  errors  using  districts  as 
clusters. 
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Table  A.1:  Robustness  Checks 
Equation­by­
Multivariate  tobit  equation  tobit 
(a)  Self­employment,  agriculture 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CV  of  rainfall×102 

















(b)  Wage  work,  agriculture  paid  in  cash 
CV  of  rainfall×102 

















(c)  Wage  work,  agriculture  paid  in  kind 
CV  of  rainfall×102 

















(d)  Wage  work,  non­agriculture 
CV  of  rainfall×102 

















Village  characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
District  characteristics  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Log­likelihood  ­15300.00  ­15262.17  ­15219.81  ­15691.45 
LR  χ2  (P­value)  160.37  (0.00)  84.73  (0.00)  ­ 943.29  (0.00) 
Notes:  (1)  All  regressions  are  implemented  with  other  variables  included,  such  as  household  charac­
teristics,  district  average  rainfall  and  UP  state  dummy.  Coeﬃcient  estimates  on  these  variables  have 
been  dropped  for  brevity  but  are  available  on  request. 
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Figure  A.1:  An  Example  of  the  Optimal  Labor  Supply
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